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Abstract
This paper examines the microeconomic motivation of governments to
provide tax incentives for foreign direct investment. Author applies the clas-
sical models of oligopoly to subsidy competition, endogenousing investment
incentives, but leaving tax rates exogenous. According to the conventional
wisdom, subsidy competition leads to overprovision of incentives. This paper
suggests that, in the oligopolistic framework, supranational coordination can
either decrease or increase the supply of subsidies. Further, in the setting
of subsidy regulation, the host country’s corporate income tax rate has an
ambiguous effect on the provision of incentives.
Keywords: Investment incentives, Subsidy competition, Productivity spillo-
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1 Introduction
In the last decades, a rivalry for foreign direct investment (FDI) has been catching
the attention of economists increasingly. With loosing restraints to international
trade and growing volumes of FDI since the early 1980s, FDI competition has
been progressively escalating; and thus the question of foreign direct investment
incentives (INIs) is getting on urgency. In an effort to obtain FDI under their
legislation, governments offer extensive support at all levels, capable of granting
hundreds of thousands USD per one generated working station.1 Sympathizers
of INIs maintain that worldwide subsidy competition is a game with a positive
∗An earlier draft of this paper received Honorable Mention by the President of the Czech
Economic Society in the Young Economist Award 2007 competition and Bolzano Award 2007 by
the Rector of the Charles University. I am much obliged particularly to Zuzana Irsˇova´ for her
valuable suggestions. Great help was provided by Ivo Koubek, Terezie Lokaj´ıcˇkova´ and Radek
Bulva as well. The usual caveat applies.
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1See, e.g., Brazil incentives for Renault and Mercedes in the 1990s (da Motta Veiga & Iglesias
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outcome—positive externalities linked to FDI are being internalized and the total
allocation of investments is said to be more efficient than without INIs. But the
majority of economists is rather skeptical toward subsidy competition. They claim
that the increase in allocation efficiency is nowise guaranteed; INIs can per contra
bring extensive distortions to various markets, and globally a race to the bottom in
the form of constantly lower tax revenues and loosening of ecological standards—
or impeding socially efficient tightening of these standards, which would follow
otherwise—much like a threat to employees’ rights.2
As all available meta-analyses (Go¨rg & Strobl 2001; Meyer & Sinani 2005;
Wooster & Diebel 2006; Havra´nek & Irsˇova´ 2008) illustrate, there is no persuasive
empirical evidence of technological and knowledge diffusion, which—in the form of
productivity spillovers—presents the most important theoretical background for
the provision of INIs. This holds especially for intra-industry spillovers, while an
elaborate empirical analysis of inter-industry spillovers is only at its beginnings.
Until a satisfactory resolution of this problem will be given, one can hardly draw
any relevant conclusions about the efficiency of INIs.
Which aspects affect an offered INI volume the most? To what degree is the
international subsidy competition intense? To help with the discussion of such
problems, we will present two supply-of-investment-incentives models; the first
one for the minimal sufficient INI, the other one for the optimal INI; and we will
attempt to integrate them into a more general model.
Most of theoretical works call for some form of global coordination of INIs
(see, inter alia, UNCTAD 1996), hoping that such agreement would decrease the
provision of INIs—thus implicitly assuming that free subsidy competition leads
to overprovision of FDI incentives. To our knowledge, the first formalized model
which shows that this need not be the case is Haufler & Wooton (2006). In the
present paper, we support their claim, using a very different, regime-competition
model.3 It is also shown that higher corporate income tax (CIT) rate does not
necessarily increase the optimal subsidy levels, as could be intuitively expected.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a survey of related
literature; the Minimal Sufficient INI Model (a targeted-competition model) is
going to be proposed. Section 3 introduces the Optimal INI Model (a regime-
competition model) and lists a few modifications. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The Minimal Sufficient INI Model
2.1 Related Work
There has been a substantial body of literature concerning with formalized mod-
eling of the provision of INIs. Absolute majority of models varies in assumptions
rather than in methodology—different premises mean different definitions of cor-
responding public utility functions. From our perspective, the key precondition is
the presence of positive externalities from FDI, i.e. productivity spillovers, because
2Oman (2000, pg. 20) compares the process to the wave of devaluations and protectionism of
the 1930s; issue has a character of the prisoner’s dilemma.
3For an excellent discussion of different types of competition, see OECD (2003).
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this presumption offers a fundamental line of reasoning for the very existence of
subsidy systems. Let us outline the most relevant works:
Haaparanta (1996) postulates that countries maximize wage income of their
citizens resulting from working for foreign investors. Incentive schemes upset
optimal investment allocation—in the equilibrium, even countries with relatively
high wages can attract investments, although all countries grant optimal INIs
from their point of view. Therefore, in comparison to the situation when no one
granted subsidies, countries with lower competitiveness can augment the volume
of attracted FDI.
In Haaland & Wooton (1999), the entry of a multinational company (MNC)
to the local market increases demand for intermediate products made in the host
country, which leads to other companies’ entry to the imperfect competition mar-
ket of intermediates. Improved competing background motivates other foreign
investors to enter the country, thereby multiplicatively raises national income and
social welfare. Governments are aware of these effects—hence they grant INIs in
an effort to compete with other countries, awaiting the same benefits.
Barros & Cabral (2000) study competition between a smaller country with
high unemployment rate and a larger country without this problem. They as-
sume that there are no such firms capable of competing with the MNC. In the
absence of subsidies, the country with larger domestic market is more attractive
but has less motivation to lure the investment. Subsequently, a rivalry by means of
incentives could end in locating the investment into the smaller country. The au-
thors argue that incentives can increase total welfare—the smaller country needs
the investment more and has a higher benefit from attracting it.
Pennings (2001) presents a two-agent model of a country and a foreign mo-
nopolistic producer. The company can choose whether to export its products into
the country or to undergo a horizontal FDI. In conclusion, for a country which
maximizes public utility an optimal strategy is to compensate investor’s expenses
fully by incentives and subsequently by taxes to reduce income which exceeds his
alternative profit from importing into the country.
Haufler & Wooton (2006) decompose competition between two countries facing
the third one simultaneously. They are the first to show that in comparison to“free
subsidy competition”, coordinated policy of two countries could bring a decrease
as well as an increase of offered INIs.
Bjorvatn & Eckel (2006) analyze FDI competition between asymmetric coun-
tries, differing both in market size and structure. They consider a presence of
domestic firms and show that competition tends to be strong especially when
both countries are similar in terms of business conditions. In such cases, countries
can provide really significant INIs, and vice versa.
Ma (2007) supposes that inflow of FDI has certain redistribution effects in the
domestic economy. He investigates the influence of interest groups on the compe-
tition intensity between competing countries. Due to this tension, the winner can
be also the country that would not otherwise have a chance to succeed; and the
costs of attracting FDI increase for both countries.
Although we got inspired by the aforementioned models, we shall use a differ-
ent methodology. Our intention is to demonstrate which influences are the most
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powerful toward the amount of INIs provision—we are interested in their deter-
minants, not in the efficiency of provision. Let us start from the model of Haufler
& Wooton (1999) and its later application by Sedmihradsky´ (2002).4 Firstly, we
adjust their model for its consecutive application for the expression of minimal
sustainable tax relief.
2.2 Methodology and Basic Assumptions
Definition 1. Minimal sustainable tax relief of country i or critical rate of tax
relief of country i means the smallest feasible incentive of country i which makes
an investor indifferent between the alternatives of countries i and j (i, j ∈ {1, 2}).
Assumption 1. Assume two countries of different size that vary except GDP
also in the level of wage costs and corporate income tax (CIT) rate. Think of an
MNC producing a sole product. The company faces descending demand curve—to
simplify, it is a global monopoly. Let individual demand functions be in the form:
d(q) = a− q
b
,
where q is price and a, b are respective parameters of the demand.
Assumption 2. Investor’s home country does not tax its residents’ foreign-earned
incomes. Furthermore, there is no transfer pricing within the MNC.
The investor considers investing into a production capacity. Since we do not
consider any other markets, the company can choose ideally from these possibili-
ties: (i) to invest in Country 1 and export part of its production to Country 2, (ii)
to invest in Country 2 and import into Country 1, (iii) to invest in both countries,
or (iv) not to invest at all. If we presume the existence of transaction costs of
goods transportation from Country 1 to Country 2 and vice versa (e.g., expenses
connected with transport, distribution, marketing, market research, etc.), investor
may select the third option.
Assumption 3. Assume prohibitively high fixed costs in respect to the third
possibility. Suppose also that the company’s hypothetical profit would be positive
in both countries.
May Country 2 have number of inhabitants equal to m. Suppose that Country
1 has n-times higher GDP than Country 2. Using this proportion as a weight, let
us postulate that individual demands in both countries are symmetric.5 Demand
functions in both countries can be formulated in the following way, all parameters
being positive:
D1(q) =
m · n(a− q)
b
(1)
4It is worth mentioning that none of these models directly deals with INIs.
5It may seem more natural to use a proportion of the number of inhabitants for aggregation.
In our opinion, GDP recalculated according to purchasing power parity gives a better picture of
the market size. Such a definition of a weight can partially remove the restriction following from
the assumption of symmetrical demand functions in both countries.
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for Country 1 and similarly
D2(q) =
m(a− q)
b
(2)
for Country 2.
Our thought, following Haufler & Wooton (1999), is based on comparison of
gains of the company in dependence on its choice of the country. May the company
decide for an investment into Country 1. Then it will produce in Country 1 and
export part of this production to Country 2. In Country 1, the company sells its
products for the optimal price p1. However, in consequence of the existence of
transaction costs, in the second country’s market the demand price is raised by t,
while the MNC still obtains p1.
Let qi be the final demand price of goods in country i. Assume a linear
production function with the only variable factor—labor. For Country 1 suppose
that the wage costs are k-times higher than in Country 2:
w1 = kw2. (3)
Assumption 4 (Similarity). Investment risk is the same for both countries and
there is no further relevant difference between the countries than is expressed by
the CIT rate (τi) and parameters n and k.
2.3 Optimization
Because the only production factor is wage costs, we can directly write down an
MNC’s profit function for the first country:
pi1 = (p1 − w1) [D1(q1) +D2(q2)] . (4)
Substituting (1), (2) and (3) into (4) and rearranging, we obtain
pi1 =
m(p1 − kw2)
b
[(a− p1)(n+ 1)− t] .
The condition of the first order is
∂pi1
∂p1
= m(n+ 1)
b
(
a− 2p1 + kw2 − t
n+ 1
)
= 0. (5)
Formulating price p1 from (5), we get
p1 =
1
2
(
a+ kw2 − t
n+ 1
)
.
The maximum can be verified by the condition of the second order:
∂2pi1
∂p21
[1
2
(
a+ kw2 − t
n+ 1
)]
= −2m(n+ 1)
b
.
Substituting the optimal price into the profit function yields
pi1 =
m [(n+ 1)(a− kw2)− t]2
4b(n+ 1) . (6)
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In the same manner it is necessary to derive the formula for the second country.
Let us proceed analogically to get
pi2 =
m [(n+ 1)(a− w2)− nt]2
4b(n+ 1) . (7)
Until this moment we followed the approach of Haufler & Wooton (1999) and
Sedmihradsky´ (2002), only several smaller modifications have been made. The
continuation varies.
Let us define the net present value of investment in Country 1 as
NPV1 =
Y1∑
i=1
pi1
(1 + r)i +
M∑
j=Y1+1
pi1(1− τ1)
(1 + r)j − F , (8)
where Y1 denotes the duration of investor’s total tax relief granted by Country 1.
Assumption 5. There is no other form of INIs except the total CIT relief.6
Let M denote investment lifetime, F investment volume, τ1 statutory CIT
rate, and r discount rate. No inflation is considered. All parameters are positive
and τ1 ∈ (0, 1).
We shall formulate the model in discrete time. In period 0, the company does
not generate any profit, but expends fixed costs F . Then there is a constant flow
of profits in periods 1 to M . In periods 1 to Y1, the company exercises INIs. From
year Y1 + 1 till the end of investment’s lifetime, the profit of the company is taxed
by the usual CIT rate of Country 1. Discount rate is constant throughout the
investment lifetime and is the same for both countries. Substituting (6) into (8)
yields
NPV1 =
Y1∑
i=1
m [(n+ 1)(a− kw2)− t]2
4b(n+ 1)(1 + r)i
+
M∑
j=Y1+1
m [(n+ 1)(a− kw2)− t]2 (1− τ1)
4b(n+ 1)(1 + r)j − F .
The similar stands for Country 2:
NPV2 =
Y2∑
i=1
m [(n+ 1)(a− w2)− nt]2
4b(n+ 1)(1 + r)i
+
M∑
j=Y2+1
m [(n+ 1)(a− w2)− nt]2 (1− τ2)
4b(n+ 1)(1 + r)j − F .
6With regard to this assumption let us use the terms “total tax relief”, “tax allowances”, “tax
holidays” and “INIs” as synonyms on the following pages.
6
If profit parity is valid for both countries, that means if investor is indifferent when
deciding to which country to place his investment, the following must stand:
Y1∑
i=1
[(n+ 1)(a− kw2)− t]2
(1 + r)i +
M∑
j=Y1+1
[(n+ 1)(a− kw2)− t]2 (1− τ1)
(1 + r)j =
=
Y2∑
i=1
[(n+ 1)(a− w2)− nt]2
(1 + r)i +
M∑
j=Y2+1
[(n+ 1)(a− w2)− nt]2 (1− τ2)
(1 + r)j .
Consequently, neither the number of inhabitants of Country 2 nor fixed investment
costs will have any influence on the result. We facilitate the situation by installing
zero discount rate for further steps.7 Thus we can write
Y1 [(n+ 1)(a− kw2)− t]2 + (M − Y1)(1− τ1) [(n+ 1)(a− kw2)− t]2 =
= Y2 [(n+ 1)(a− w2)− nt]2 + (M − Y2)(1− τ2) [(n+ 1)(a− w2)− nt]2 .
After rearrangements and extraction of Y1, we get
Y1 =
[(n+ 1)(a− w2)− nt
(n+ 1)(a− kw2)− t
]2 M(1− τ2) + Y2τ2
τ1
− M(1− τ1)
τ1
. (9)
Due to (6) and (7), (9) can be also written as
Y1 =
pi2
pi1
[M(1− τ2) + Y2τ2]−M(1− τ1)
τ1
. (10)
2.4 Comparative Statics
Definition 2. Let us set the relative quality of entrepreneurial environment in
country i as the ratio pii/pij . If this is more than 1, the environment in country i
is better than in country j.
Proposition 1. Minimal sustainable tax benefit of country i is ceteris paribus
descending in the quality level of the entrepreneurial environment in i.
Proof. First, let us differentiate (10):
∂Y1
∂
(
pi1
pi2
) = −
(
pi1
pi2
)−2
[M(1− τ2) + Y2τ2]
τ1
.
For τ2 ∈ (0, 1) the expression M(1 − τ2) + Y2τ2 is always nonnegative, as the
duration of tax holidays cannot exceed investment lifetime. Thus, the numerator
is positive as well as the whole derivative.
7Counting with nonzero discount rate does not bring any additional value added regarding
the key results of the model; and it can be shown that there exists no closed-form solution in
such a case. Moreover, since there is a constant flow of profits, we find this simplification even
consistent. One could equivalently suppose that the flow of profits is rising each year by such a
coefficient that would compensate the fact of future profits being discounted. Ad libitum.
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Proposition 2. Minimal sustainable incentive level in country i is increasing in
the relative price of its labor power.
Proof. Realizing that k negatively influences the profit of the company in Country
1, but does not affect its profit in Country 2, pi2/pi1 increases and the attractiveness
of Country 1’s entrepreneurial environment decreases. Following Proposition 1,
the critical subsidy level in Country 1 must increase.
Proposition 3 (Strong competition). Minimal sustainable INI in country i is
increasing in CIT of country i, if relative entrepreneurial environment in country
i is better than in country j.
Proof. Examining an influence of the CIT rate on the critical benefit period, let
us differentiate:
∂Y1
∂τ1
=
M − pi2pi1 [M(1− τ2) + Y2τ2]
τ21
. (11)
Because M(1− τ2) + Y2τ2 is always less or equal to M and since the ratio pi2/pi1
is less than 1, numerator in (11) will be positive. Note that if the last condition
does not stand, nothing about the sign of the derivation can be said. Thus it is
possible that Y1 need not be increasing in τ1; for instance, if Country 2 is much
larger, richer or notably cheaper in terms of labor costs, and τ2 is simultaneously
close to zero (or, analogically, Y2 →M). But such counter-intuitive result requires
drastic assumptions, therefore we do not consider it to be a representative feature
of this model.
Proposition 4 (Weak competition). Minimal sustainable incentive level in coun-
try i is increasing in the subsidy range of country j.
Proof. Dependence of the critical incentive level in country i on the stimuli dura-
tion of country j is very simple:
∂Y1
∂Y2
= pi2τ2
pi1τ1
.
The result is evident due to Assumption 3 and positive τi.
Instead of differentiating (10) with respect to all variables, it is more convenient
to demonstrate model functioning on a simple example. Let us choose initial
parameters (row 1 in Table 1) and calibrate the model, followed by the discussion
of relatively more relevant parameters.
Example 1. Presumed investment lifetime is 20 years. Let a, the parameter of
investors’ demand, be 100. Workload needed to produce a unit of commodity is
$10 for Country 2, $12 for Country 1. Country 1 has twice as large market as
its rival. Transportation of goods to the other country means additional costs of
$10. CIT rate is 30% in both countries; Country 2 provides tax holidays to each
foreign investment for 10 years, automatically. The competitor decides ad hoc,
individually for each investor. The question is, how rich incentives Country 1 has
to grant to make investors indifferent between the two countries.
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Table 1: Sensibility of the Minimal Sufficient INI Model
Line no. Y1 Y2 τ1 τ2 a n k M t
1 8.23 10 0.3 0.3 100 2 1.2 20 10
2 13.07 15 0.3 0.3 100 2 1.2 20 10
3 3.39 5 0.3 0.3 100 2 1.2 20 10
4 11.17 10 0.4 0.3 100 2 1.2 20 10
5 2.34 10 0.2 0.3 100 2 1.2 20 10
6 5.00 10 0.3 0.4 100 2 1.2 20 10
7 11.46 10 0.3 0.2 100 2 1.2 20 10
8 9.85 10 0.3 0.3 1 2 1.2 20 10
9 5.72 10 0.3 0.3 50 2 1.2 20 10
10 4.04 10 0.3 0.3 100 5 1.2 20 10
11 12.76 10 0.3 0.3 100 1 1.2 20 10
12 12.34 10 0.3 0.3 100 2 1.5 20 10
13 3.39 10 0.3 0.3 100 2 0.8 20 10
14 7.86 10 0.3 0.3 100 2 1.2 25 10
15 8.96 10 0.3 0.3 100 2 1.2 10 10
16 3.68 10 0.3 0.3 100 2 1.2 20 20
17 10.44 10 0.3 0.3 100 2 1.2 20 5
Source: author’s computations on the basis of result (10).
First column of the first row of Table 1 shows the situation from Example 1,
where tax exemption of 8.2 years suffices. What happens if Country 2 changes its
strategy? Apparently, increases in the duration of tax holidays in Country 2 force
the first country to raise its incentive almost proportionally. This results already
from Proposition 4.
In accordance with Proposition 3, raising CIT in Country 1 by one third
increases the minimal sufficient INI by 3 years, and vice versa. Changes in CIT
of the rival country will have an antagonistic effect. Rising CIT of Country 2 to
40% results in a decrease of the critical period of tax relief to 5 years; on the other
hand, a shift to 20% will lead to an increase of subsidy to 11.5 years.
It is obvious that multiple changes in parameter a may influence incentives
only a little. The next two lines show an impact of changes in relative economic
power—the stronger purchasing power Country 1 has, the smaller amount of INIs
the country has to provide. In lines 12 and 13 changes in relative wage costs are
itemized. The growth in costs of Country 1 (represented by the rise of k from
1.2 to 1.5) means an escalation in minimal sufficient incentive to 12.3 years—
wage costs have a noticeable impact on the critical length of subsidy, in line with
Proposition 2. Conversely, a change in investment lifetime M will not influence
critical length of subsidy very much for such selected parameters’ values.
Proposition 5 (Investment lifetime’s neutrality). If both countries have the same
CIT and quality of entrepreneurial environment, the investment lifetime does not
affect the critical rate of INI.
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Proof. Differentiating (10) with respect to M yields:
∂Y1
∂M
=
pi2
pi1
(1− τ2)− (1− τ1)
τ1
.
Employing both assumptions, the result is evident.
Simultaneously, if Country 1 has better entrepreneurial environment than
Country 2 but higher CIT, the critical rate of incentive will grow in M . In this
case, competing with a more populous, poorer country with lower CIT rate (say,
the Czech Republic vs. Poland), a relatively smaller and richer country with higher
CIT has to offer noticeably higher incentives for long-term investments. This fact
is overestimated because of the condition of zero discount rate (in comparative
statics, influence of M is the only aspect strongly affected by this condition). Fi-
nally, if transaction costs are relatively high (line 16), the market of the larger
country (Country 1) is worse accessible and the company will rather decide to
invest directly there. Minimal sustainable incentive for this country decreases
relatively fast.
2.5 Application on the Visegrad Countries
Definition 3. The term incentive parity signifies a situation, when potential NPV
of the investment is the same for both countries.
In Table 2, all essential parameters are summarized for all four countries of
Visegrad group as of 2005. They were chosen on purpose; these countries are
competitors to large extent and there are no drastic divergences in economic per-
formance and institutional system, so that they largely satisfy the assumption of
similarity (Assumption 4).
On the basis of line 1 from Table 2, let us calculate n, i.e. population pur-
chasing power ratio, while from the second row we ascertain k for all countries
regarding the Czech Republic (CR). The question is how rich incentive the CR
has to offer to keep the investor indifferent.
In the first part of Table 3, let us examine the case of 24% CIT rate in the
Czech Republic, as of 2007. In the second part, we try to analyze how the result
would change if the Czech CIT rate decreased to, say, 15%. As we see, in the first
case (present situation), INIs were set broadly at par to Slovakia and Hungary—
the model results give 10.9 and 10.4 respectively, not far from the real value (10
years). However, Poland had the parity much higher—at 13.3 years. The market
size has the greatest impact on this outcome; recalling that the model does not
assume purely vertical FDI, this result is not really surprising.
If tax rate had been reduced all the way to 15% in the Czech Republic, in-
centive parity would have decreased noticeably toward Hungary as well as toward
Slovakia. The CR could allow decreasing amount of INIs, admittedly at the risk
of losing some marginal investors in favour of Poland (with Poland, parity stays
steadily above 10 years). If the incentive provision is fully stopped after tax re-
duction to 15%, parity would not hold even vis-a`-vis Hungary and Slovakia, and
it would not be convenient for the investor in this model to invest in the CR. For
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Table 2: Chosen indicators for surveyed countries
2005 Czech Rep. Slovakia Poland Hungary
GDP 187,611 86,753 495,885 169,875
W 1,096 704 887 921
CIT 24% 19% 19% 16%
Y 10 10 F/2 8
Note: GDP—Value is in millions of USD according to PPP.
W—Total wage costs—“supergross wage” in USD per month, recounted by average exchange
rate of 2005.
Poland does not have any time limit of tax relief utilization, but (in most of the country)
it allows to use allowances up to one half of initial investment—it takes an advantage of
effective European legislation. Since it is a higher allowance than in the Czech Republic, let
us approximate it to, for instance, 12 years (a rather conservative estimation).
Hungary provides 80% CIT reliefs for up to 10 years, which is approximated to 8 years of
total tax relief.
Source: IMF (2006, estimates), Gola (2006), Devereux (2006), www.czechinvest.cz,
www.sario.sk, www.paiz.gov.pl, www.itd.hu.
Table 3: Results of critical tax-relief period rate for the Czech Republic
Case Y1 Y2 τ1 τ2 a n k w2 M t
CR—Slovakia 10.9 10 0.24 0.19 1,000 2.16 1.56 5 15 10
CR—Poland 13.3 12 0.24 0.19 1,000 0.38 1.24 5 15 10
CR—Hungary 10.4 8 0.24 0.16 1,000 1.10 1.19 5 15 10
CR—Slovakia 8.5 10 0.15 0.19 1,000 2.16 1.56 5 15 10
CR—Poland 12.3 12 0.15 0.19 1,000 0.38 1.24 5 15 10
CR—Hungary 7.6 8 0.15 0.16 1,000 1.10 1.19 5 15 10
Source: author’s computations from Table 2 and result (10).
instance vis-a`-vis Slovakia, the Czech Republic would have to reduce CIT down
to 6.5% to compensate the investor for the abolition of present INIs.
2.6 Limitations & Extensions
It stands to reason that model results from Table 3 should be taken “with a
grain of salt”. We do not claim that incentive parity actually holds (or hold) in
Central Europe, it was merely an illustrative example. The model is very simple in
methodology, also engaging only in a restricted number of parameters—certainly
there is a different labor productivity among the examined countries, regardless
of many other FDI determinants. Each country has certain specific assets (e.g.,
location) important for investors, but hardly quantifiable. The other possible
improvement is to use effective instead of statutory corporate income tax rate.
Naturally, income tax relief is not the only form of INIs that governments keep
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at disposition, although it is probably the most utilized one (Newton 2003). For
advanced countries, which usually prioritize financial subsidies,8 such precondition
is particularly restrictive while in other countries, tax holidays make usually a
noticeable part of the whole INI. For instance according to the Czech Supreme
Audit Office report (SAO 2006, pg. 9), the CR provided CIT reliefs in the amount
of 5,102 million CZK in 1998–2005, compared to financial INIs of 247 million CZK.
CIT reliefs thus represented more than 95% of the total provided volume of INIs.
However, it might be useful to expand the model by other kinds of incentives,
especially the financial ones.
3 The Optimal INI Model
3.1 Intuition and Methodology
While the model introduced in the last section formulated the minimal INI ade-
quate to keep investor indifferent in decision-making between both countries, now
we try to determine how large INI is really optimal for the given country. With
reference, inter alia, to Blomstrom & Kokko (2003), we consider FDI as a public
good associated with externalities (naturally under certain circumstances, which
is not a subject of discussion here). For this chapter let us consider only positive
FDI externalities—positive productivity spillovers.
The model from the last chapter is solved from investor’s point of view—
the government has only a possibility to change the volume of INIs in reaction to
investor’s profit parity. In this model, we will approach the situation directly from
the chosen country’s view. Nevertheless, the attitude toward the problem will be
opposite to what is common in available literature. Very often we can encounter
such a formulation that—by means of incentives—governments buy spillovers (e.g.
Newton 2003; Ma 2007). Sometimes, the competition for FDI is directly compared
to an auction: the MNC auctions FDI, governments try to outbid each other (see
Besley & Seabright 1999).
In such a case, one would assume INIs to be a form of a price which countries
pay for FDI, or directly for spillovers connected to it. Our approach in this
chapter is, however, not so straightforward. The introduced model is based on
understanding INIs as commodities of some kind produced by the government and
demanded by potential investors. Nevertheless, INIs of both countries are not
identical for the MNC—let us simply assume that the MNC perceives incentives
of Country 1 and Country 2 as different, although related, goods. To formalize,
we see a certain analogy with the Cournot oligopoly model, because the way of
maximization (modifications of the offered quantity) corresponds to our thinking
about incentives-based competition for FDI the best.
Why did we decide to interpret the issue precisely in this manner, quite differ-
ently from formulations of existing models? If an MNC plans to invest, it usually
makes a list of several acceptable countries or regions. Their governments are then
contacted in an effort to obtain the best INI possible (see, e.g., Oman 2000). At
this stage, FDI competition is reduced to the incentives-based rivalry concerning
8One of the exceptions is for instance Singapore (Sieh Lee 1998).
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usually only a few countries—therefore we consider oligopoly in our model. Since
we want to apply the Cournot oligopoly model, MNC’s inverse demand functions
(quasiprice which the MNC “pays” for INIs) need to be derived. However, we
simply assume here that the inverse demand functions have the shape described
in the following paragraphs.
Let us divide host country’s benefits from FDI into (i) productivity spillovers
and (ii) other effects (nonexternalities). The MNC is aware of positive externali-
ties generated by its investments (denoted by ξ), but it cannot influence the size
of such spillovers (denoted by ξ). Thus this value will form the autonomous term
in inverse demand function (12). May the MNC’s willingness to pay for INIs refer
to the other FDI effects in our model. These are determined by the MNC itself
and can be either positive or negative. The higher CIT rate in a certain country,
the more willing the MNC is to pay for INIs offered by this country (parameter αi
in (12) will be positive). Higher tax burden in the country providing INIs means
that the incentive presents a higher utility for the investor—and he is now willing
to “pay” a higher quasiprice.
Analogically, the higher the CIT rate in the rival country, the less ready the
MNC is to pay for incentives of the first country (negative parameter βi). As
with the CIT increase in Country 2 the MNC does not demand high incentives in
Country 1 (Country 2 is getting ceteris paribus less competitive and the negotiat-
ing power of Country 1 strengthens), its willingness to pay for INIs of Country 1
decreases. Finally, the quasiprice will fall with an increase of provided volume
of INIs by the given country—the same as with an increase of INIs of the rival
country since the MNC perceives them as relatively close substitutes. In other
words, we assume downward-sloping demand curves.
3.2 Basic Assumptions
Assumption 6 (Separation). Consider the decision making to be separate for
INIs and the CIT rate. The latter is set exogenously and government seeks the
optimal INI.
Assumption 7 (Exclusivity). The government has merely one form of INIs at its
disposal—the total CIT relief for Y years. Furthermore, tax holidays are granted
automatically so that each foreign investor can be sure to obtain them.
Assumption 8. For the sake of simplicity, let us consider a model of duopoly
competitors. Both countries have certain specific assets for investors (e.g., a fa-
vorable location), so that after a simultaneous reduction of incentives from the
Cournot equilibrium, investor does not decide to exit into a third country. Let
the inverse demand functions be linear in τi and Yi.
May the inverse demand functions for INIs be (see discussion in Subsection 3.1)
φi(Yi, Yj) = ξi + αiτi − βiτj − γiYi − δiYj , i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, (12)
where ξi stands for spillovers, τi ∈ (0, 1) is statutory CIT rate in country i and
Yi is the length of the total CIT relief in years. All the parameters are positive
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and moreover assume that αi > βi > γi > δi holds. The reason is the following:
taking into account that investor’s preferences about the CIT rate and duration
of tax holidays probably do not differ significantly and since αi and βi influence
the tax rate for which the restriction τ ∈ (0, 1) holds, they should be higher than
γi and δi. It is also reasonable to assume that in each inverse demand function
for country i’s INIs, τi has higher impact than τj as well as the importance of Yi
exceeds that of Yj , therefore αi > βi and γi > δi holds.
To form a model, we need to choose a way of countries’ costs-of-incentives
expression. The methodology differs; usually one can encounter an erosion of
tax system and home firms’ discrimination, since they are often unable to obtain
INIs (Oman 2000). However, these factors can be quantified only with difficulties.
In the present paper, we use Wells et al. (2001): the costs of tax holidays can
be understood as the relief duration in years multiplied by the CIT rate, overall
FDI coming to the country (I), expected gross investment rate of return (J) and
so-called redundancy rate (R):
TCi = τiRiIiJiYi, (13)
where Ri ∈ (0, 1] is that part of investors that would have come to the country
even without any INIs. Expression (13) then forms the lost tax income.
Assumption 9 (Weak INIs’ efficiency). The received incentive is for all investors
the smallest necessary to make them invest into the country.
Ii and Ri are dependent on Yi, so they are not parameters. R is in fact a
function of Y , comprehended in form of
R(Y ) = 1− w(Y ),
where w(Y ) stands for the function for which the following properties apply:
w ∈ C1(R), w(0) = 0, lim
Y→∞
w(Y ) = 1, w′(Y ) ≥ 0, w′′(Y ) ≤ 0.
Lemma 1. If TCi = τiRiIiJiYi holds, then TCi = τiI0i JiYi holds as well, where
I0i is the investment volume in the case of nonexistence of INIs.
Explanation. If a country does not provide INIs, then R = 1; i.e., all investors
naturally come into the country without any INIs and I = I0. As soon as the
country starts to increase INIs, from the definition of R, incoming investment
volume will rise according to the equation I = I0 + (1 − R)I. Sensibility of
investors to INIs is represented by (1 − R), which is precisely w(Y ). Then, the
investment can be derived easily as I = I0/R and after insertion into (13), we
obtain the desired expression.
Assumption 10 (Symmetry). Spillover value and the average rate of return on
investment is the same for both countries. In the case of nonexistence of INIs, let
the investment inflow be identical for both countries.
Assumption 11. Countries provide generic incentive schemes—we do not con-
sider for now that governments have a possibility to negotiate with individual
investors. Countries offer INIs ex ante, being the same for all investors.
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3.3 Decentralized Equilibrium
Let both countries be Cournot duopolists maximizing their individual profit. None
of the countries has perfect information about the exact volume of INIs offered
by the second country at its disposal. The total revenue from INIs of Country 1
will then be
TR1(Y1, Y2) = ξY1 + α1τ1Y1 − β1τ2Y1 − γ1Y 21 − δ1Y1Y2. (14)
Applying Lemma 1, the total costs of INIs will reach
TC1 = τ1I0JY1. (15)
On the basis of (14) and (15), one can formulate the profit function (where as
the “profit” we consider the utility of the given country from provided INIs):
Π1 = ξY1 + α1τ1Y1 − β1τ2Y1 − γ1Y 21 − δ1Y1Y2 − Y1τ1I0J.
From the condition of the first order, we solve for Y1 and obtain the reaction
function of Country 1:
Y1 =
ξ + α1τ1 − β1τ2 − δ1Y2 − τ1I0J
2γ1
. (16)
Similarly, let us derive the reaction function of Country 2:
Y2 =
ξ + α2τ2 − β2τ1 − δ2Y1 − τ2I0J
2γ2
. (17)
Terms (16) and (17) give together a system of equations—two reaction curves.
The final Cournot equilibrium will be reached in the point of intersection of these
curves. After modifications and substitution, the equilibrium value will have the
form of
Y C1 =
ξ(2γ2 − δ1) + τ1(2α1γ2 + δ1β2 − 2γ2I0J)
4γ1γ2 − δ1δ2
− τ2(2β1γ2 + α2δ1 − δ1I
0J)
4γ1γ2 − δ1δ2 . (18)
(18) sets the optimal volume of INIs for Country 1, provided no country has
“an advantage of the first move” and no agreement is possible—we deal with a
simultaneous noncooperative one-shot game.
Both propositions in this subsection are straightforward applications of equi-
librium condition (18). Let us start with the influence of spillovers.
Proposition 6. The amount of incentives under “free subsidy competition” in the
Cournot equilibrium is an increasing function of positive FDI spillovers.
Proof. Let us simply differentiate (18):
∂Y1
∂τ1
= 2γ2 − δ14γ1γ2 − δ1δ2 .
Being aware of the primary condition γi > δi, we get the result.
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Proposition 7. The host country’s CIT rate (τ1) has an ambiguous effect on the
optimal level of INIs. The effect tends to be negative if many MNCs are willing
to invest into the country even without any incentives and if the returns on such
investments are high.
Proof. It is necessary to differentiate (18) with respect to τ1:
∂Y1
∂ξ
= 2α1γ2 + δ1β2 − 2γ2I
0J
4γ1γ2 − δ1δ2 .
The denominator of is positive, but we cannot say anything about the sign of
the nominator. This can be surprising because the CIT rate is naturally closely
related to tax incentives in MNCs’ decision-making and one would expect the
influence to be clearly positive. However, in the current model, the amount of lost
taxation rises with the increasing CIT and, on the other hand, the higher CIT, the
more INIs investors require since their net rate of return declines—see definition
of the respective demands in (12)—, which increases government’s revenue from
the provision of INIs. The total effect is slight and unclear. Differentiation with
respect to τ2 yields a very similar formula with opposite signs—thus it seems that
if τ1 increases Y1, τ2 tends to decrease it, and vice versa.
Parameter γ1 raises the denominator in (18), but does not affect the numer-
ator, thus the optimal volume of INIs decreases with its growth. Parameter δ2
has a contrary influence; it decreases the denominator, but does not occur in the
numerator. It is not so simple to estimate the impact of other parameters; there-
fore we project the performance of the model on an example and in particular on
Table 4.
Example 2. For illustration, let the Czech and Slovak republics be competitors
and the respective demand functions for INIs be symmetrical. Let us select the
following demand parameters: αi = 100, βi = 50, γi = 20, δi = 10. Spillovers
are assessed to be 400. Assume that the investment value which would come
to the country even without incentives is equal to 1000 and its average rate of
return is 10%. In 2007, the CIT rate was 19% in Slovakia and 24% in the Czech
Republic. This example is described in the first row of Table 4—the optimal tax
relief provided by the CR will last for 7.8 years under these conditions. What
happens if the spillover effect rises by 50% to 600? The optimal INI increases to
11.8 years.
3.4 Stackelberg Leadership
Admittedly, simultaneous game principle does not have to be fulfilled in practice.
Suppose that the government of Country 1 has “an advantage of the first move”,
so that Country 1 is a quantity leader in the sense of Stackelberg. The country
that is the first one to provide INIs in the region or which is the most successful
in attracting foreign investors can become such a leader. In the last decades, Sin-
gapore can serve as an example for the region of Southeastern Asia (see Charlton
2003). Country 1 (leader) knows ex ante that Country 2 (follower) will react to
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its move. Government in Country 1 knows the reaction function of Country 2:
Y2 =
ξ + α2τ2 − β2τ1 − δ2Y1 − τ2I0J
2γ2
, (19)
Thus Country 1 uses the reaction function of Country 2 in its profit function:
Π1 = ξY1 + α1τ1Y1 − β1τ2Y1 − γ1Y 21
− δ1Y1 ξ + α2τ2 − β2τ1 − δ2Y1 − τ2I
0J
2γ2
− Y1τ1I0J.
From the condition of the first order we derive Y1 and get the optimal amount of
incentives in Country 1 for the leader of the sequential game:
Y S1 =
ξ(2γ2 − δ1) + τ1(2α1γ2 + δ1β2 − 2γ2I0J)
4γ1γ2 − 2δ1δ2
− τ2(2β1γ2 + α2δ1 − δ1I
0J)
4γ1γ2 − 2δ1δ2 . (20)
Proposition 8. Duration of tax relief in the case of the Stackelberg leadership
stays greater than in the case of Cournot competition.
Proof. The new term has a higher denominator, while the numerator stays the
same, therefore Y C1 < Y
S
1 always holds.
Analogically to the standard model of the Stackelberg leader, the results are
higher provision of INIs and higher “income” for Country 1. Thanks to the simi-
larity of expressions, discussion of parameters influences of the Stackelberg equi-
librium will not be necessary because they will not differ from the case of Cournot.
Proposition 6 and also all the conclusions made in the discussion about (18) are
valid here as well.
Example 3. Let all parameters be the same as in Example 2. The Czech Republic
and Slovakia are again duopolists providing INIs, but the Czech Republic is now
the Stackelberg leader—this modification changes optimal duration of tax holidays
to 8.4 years.
3.5 Supranational Coordination
Even if the absolute majority of theoretical works calls for some form of global
regulation of INIs (see, inter alia, UNCTAD 1996), it has not appeared in a notice-
able extent till nowadays; apparently no credible threat for the case of violation
of such agreements exists.
A typical example can be found in Charlton (2003, pg. 29): in 1991, the states
of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut made an agreement on restrictions of
incentives for investors transferring their activities from one state to another.
However, New Jersey promptly violated this contract, trying to attract by an
incentive of 50 million dollars First Chicago Corporation, which kept at that time
1,500 employees in the neighboring New York. New York reacted with even a
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more generous incentive and made the company stay. As a result, the inter-state
agreement lasted for only four days.
Our model changes with the assumption of coordination. To maximize the
common profit from INIs, the supranational entity maximizes the profit function
Π1+2 = ξY1 + α1τ1Y1 − β1τ2Y1 − γ1Y 21 − δ1Y1Y2 − Y1τ1I0J
+ ξY2 + α2τ2Y2 − β2τ1Y2 − γ2Y 22 − δ2Y1Y2 − Y2τ2I0J.
From the first order condition with respect to Y1 we derive
Y1 =
ξ + α1τ1 − β1τ2 − δ1Y2 − τ1I0J − δ2Y2
2γ1
. (21)
Similarly from the first order condition with respect to Y2 we calculate
Y2 =
ξ + α2τ2 − β2τ1 − δ2Y1 − τ2I0J − δ1Y1
2γ2
. (22)
In the case of both countries’ agreement, substituting (22) into (21) we obtain
for Y1:
Y K1 =
ξ(2γ2 + δ1 + δ2) + τ1
[
2γ2(α1 − I01J1)− β2(δ1 + δ2)
]
4γ1γ2 − (δ1 + δ2)2
− τ2
[
2β1γ2 + (δ1 + δ2)(I02J2 − α2)
]
4γ1γ2 − (δ1 + δ2)2 . (23)
Example 4. Following Example 2, the chosen parameters and countries stay the
same. Providing both countries are able to agree on incentives-system coordina-
tion, the optimal duration of incentive in the Czech Republic will decrease to 6.6
years. However, this conclusion cannot be generalized.
Proposition 9. If both countries are able to coordinate their INI schemes, the
offered INIs can either decrease or increase, depending mainly on the assumed
spillover value.
Proof. This can be seen easily, e.g., from Table 4 which tests the sensibility of
model’s results to individual parameters. Through most of the modifications of
our example, the optimal tax-relief duration in the case of coordination stays
lower than in the decentralized equilibrium. But note the third line—in the case
of coordination, INI is higher for such selected parameters’ values.
Notice that Proposition 6 and Proposition 8 are valid even in the case of
coordination (for the same reasons as in the Cournot model). Also γ1 affects
the optimal incentive value negatively; nonetheless we cannot say anything about
parameter δ2 prima facie—it occurs both in numerator and denominator of (23).
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Table 4: Sensibility of the Optimal INI Model
Y C1 Y
S
1 Y
K
1 ξ α1 α2 β1 β2 γ1 γ2 τ1 τ2
7.8 8.4 6.6 400 100 100 50 50 20 20 0.24 0.19
11.8 12.7 9.9 600 100 100 50 50 20 20 0.24 0.19
0.1 0.1 0.2 10 100 100 50 50 20 20 0.24 0.19
10.4 11.1 9.8 400 500 100 50 50 20 20 0.24 0.19
7.3 7.8 5.8 400 10 100 50 50 20 20 0.24 0.19
6.7 7.2 3.7 400 100 1,000 50 50 20 20 0.24 0.19
7.9 8.5 6.8 400 100 10 50 50 20 20 0.24 0.19
5.5 5.9 3.7 400 100 100 500 50 20 20 0.24 0.19
8.0 8.6 6.8 400 100 100 10 50 20 20 0.24 0.19
8.5 9.2 8.4 400 100 100 50 500 20 20 0.24 0.19
7.8 8.3 6.4 400 100 100 50 10 20 20 0.24 0.19
3.0 3.1 2.2 400 100 100 50 50 50 20 0.24 0.19
10.7 11.7 9.8 400 100 100 50 50 15 20 0.24 0.19
9.4 9.5 9.3 400 100 100 50 50 20 100 0.24 0.19
5.6 6.6 0.1 400 100 100 50 50 20 10 0.24 0.19
7.9 8.5 6.8 400 100 100 50 50 20 20 0.50 0.19
7.8 8.3 6.4 400 100 100 50 50 20 20 0.10 0.19
7.4 7.9 6.0 400 100 100 50 50 20 20 0.24 0.50
7.9 8.5 6.7 400 100 100 50 50 20 20 0.24 0.10
Source: author’s computations in accordance to (18), (20) and (23).
3.6 Sensibility Analysis
We analyze the sensibility of the model in Table 4, proceeding analogously to
Section 2. Results of optimal tax-holidays period correspond to Country 1 and
our modifications (first column provides the value for the Cournot equilibrium, the
second one for the Stackelberg leadership, the third column shows supranational
coordination).
From Table 4 let us comment only the most important findings. The change
of FDI externalities has a highly considerable impact on the optimal incentive
quantity. On the contrary, the influence of changes in parameters αi and βi of the
demand function appears to be insignificant. More substantial is the influence of
γi. Increase in γ1 causes comparatively noticeable fall in incentive duration for all
modifications (Cournot, Stackelberg leadership, collusion). Parameter γ2 works
with a lower intensity in the opposite direction.
3.7 Limitations & Extensions
Determining the costs of tax holidays, we started from Wells et al. (2001), who
remind that a lost tax income is not the only expense. An important issue is
the latent form of other costs, hard to be researched and separated into a longer
period, i.e. difficult to quantify. If we admitted that such “lateral” costs could
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reach significant values, the model would have to be modified broadly.
The model has also another limitation—it would be interesting to loose the
assumption of equivalent spillover values for both countries and study how the
changes in different levels of spillovers influence the result. Furthermore, the
equal level of I0—investments that flow into the country independently of the
provision of INIs—is required for both countries. Parameter of investment rate of
return J approximates pii/F from the first model. Initial Assumption 10 is again
restrictive—nevertheless a simple solution with different values of Ji is possible.
Finally, (12) does not cover all the parameters, which can influence investor’s
“willingness to pay” for INIs. It can include the price of labor, its qualification,
macroeconomic or political stability, etc.; lots of FDI determinants can be envi-
sioned here.
Also the simplification hidden in Assumption 11 is very significant—the coun-
try has to provide each foreign investor with equivalent INI. We do not consider
negotiations between the MNC and governments that race in offering INIs to at-
tract investments—which is perhaps a relatively frequent phenomenon (see Oman
2000; Charlton 2003). However, our assumption is justifiable because we model
fiscal incentives, particularly tax holidays—and because the legislation in taxation
field changes difficultly and relatively slowly in democratic countries, fiscal INIs
use to be provided via generic schemes (see OECD 2003).
It is useful to indicate what consequences an embodiment of negotiations
between the investor and involved countries during the decision-making process
would bring to the previous model (in other words, governments can decide ad
hoc and offer incentives tailored to the needs of the MNC). Besides, if we suppose
that governments know their own minimal sufficient INI, we can illustrate the
interaction between both models. The summary is depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1: The general model of INIs’ supply
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Source: author’s scheme on the basis of the presented models.
Status quo (situation without INIs) is disrupted by some external factors in
nodal point A. If both countries choose cooperation, they get to point B—a situa-
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tion of “collusion” from our model, which satisfies the optimal INI supply Y K1 for
Country 1. Let us label YMIN1 (Y K2 ) as the value of minimal sufficient incentive,
which corresponds to the given INI of the second country. If Y K1 > Y
MIN
1 (Y K2 ),
Country 1 will succeed in investment allurement. If the equality sets in, investor
will be indifferent between both countries (incentive parity).
Proposition 10 (Unsustainability). Any collusion agreement can hold neither
one round if Y K1 = YMIN1 (Y K2 ) does not stand.
Proof. No country will willingly abandon all the chances to get FDI (if one does
not think about any kind of compensation). For more long-term stability, INIs of
both countries will be equal to their minimal sufficient INI.9
If countries do not cooperate, they will reach point C. Now each country
sets whether to provide generic or ad hoc INIs. If both countries decide for the
first possibility, they meet in point D—the situation modeled by the Cournot
competition. Country 1 gains the investment if Y C1 > Y
MIN
1 (Y C2 ).
Let Country 1 decide to offer INIs ad hoc, while Country 2 still uses a generic
scheme (point E).
Proposition 11. Expected utility of Country 1 in point E is higher or equal to
its expected utility in point D.
Proof. Country 1 has an evident strategic advantage: if Y C1 > Y
MIN
1 (Y C2 ), it
decreases Y1 close to YMIN1 (Y C2 ), but can still offer more convenient conditions
to investors. The MNC then chooses Country 1 which will moreover get better,
compared to the Cournot equilibrium. If Y C1 ≤ YMIN1 (Y C2 ), Country 1 still has a
chance of attracting the investment. It identifies such a level of provided INIs by
which its total utility from transaction is equal to zero (marked as Yˆ1) and is willing
to increase Y1 until this point and gains the investment if Yˆ1 > Y
MIN
1 (Y C2 ).
The last possibility is that both countries provide INIs ad hoc (point F). For
each country individually it is optimal to select such a Y which will slightly exceed
its minimal sufficient incentive and so will attract investment with the smallest
costs possible. This process of action and reaction ends right in the point where
at least one country provides INIs for which Yi = Yˆi. If also Yˆi < YMINi (Yˆj),
country i loses investment for the benefit of country j which will have positive
utility from the whole transaction.
Proposition 12 (Competition efficiency). If Yi = Yˆi as well as Yˆi = YMINi (Yˆj)
hold, perfect spillover internalization follows.
Proof. It comes to incentive parity; the investor is indifferent between both coun-
tries and the winner has zero utility from the transaction. The benefit is fully taken
away by the investor because each country bids up to the spillover value.
9Realize that Y1 = YMIN1 (Y2) can be valid if and only if Y2 = YMIN2 (Y1). What is more,
naturally Y1 > Y
MIN
1 (Y2) can hold if and only if Y2 < YMIN2 (Y1) .
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Figure 1 also indicates that apart from the classical dilemma of cooperation-
noncooperation, another problem in the decision-making field of the government
can exist, which can have the nature of the prisoner’s dilemma. Each country
hungers for being Country 1 in point E—where it has broader margin of maneuver,
since the second country is not flexible. If both countries strive for this flexibility
and offer INIs ad hoc (point F), apparently they will suffer in comparison to the
situation of generic provision (point D). In general, the winner will have to offer
a substantially higher incentive.10
Point F represents (the only one) stable Nash equilibrium of the game because
for none of the countries it pays off to deviate unilaterally from the strategy head-
ing to F. It implies that we should observe FDI competition “using all weapons”,
i.e. escalation of supplied incentives until the last competitor fails. However, ad
hoc application of INIs is often regulated. For example, Besley & Seabright (1999)
discuss restrictions of ad hoc incentives in the EU.
This implies that point D can be instead of F the equilibrium for country
competing inside the EU—point B is still not accessible because of the prisoner’s
dilemma, points E and F are inaccessible because of regulation. While in point
D countries provide Cournot INIs, in point F supplied INIs are close or equal to
countries’ minimal sufficient INIs.
4 Conclusion
The main aim of this paper is to contribute to a better comprehension of the
inward foreign direct investment incentives (INIs) phenomena by studying their
determinants. We introduced two simple microeconomic models, each dealing with
a different specification of the problem, and used them as tools for describing the
foreign direct investment policy-making.
The Minimal Sufficient INI Model, based on the profit parity, is solved primar-
ily from the point of view of a foreign investor—the government’s task is only to
set such a level of INIs which does not threaten its relative competitiveness with
respect to a rival country. We have deduced that toward the equilibrium level
of incentives, both country’s corporate income tax (CIT) rate and the generosity
of incentive systems of its rival countries have a principal influence. Market size
plays an important part as well.
The Optimal INI Model was tackled from the point of view of a government
maximizing public utility. The basis of the model lies in the application of the
classical models of oligopoly (Cournot, Stackelberg) to the situation of subsidy
competition. The most important conclusions include as the significance of spill-
overs for explanation of the optimal level of INIs, so the ambiguous influence of
the corporate income tax (CIT) rate. We show that possible supranational coor-
dination of incentives can either decrease or increase the supply of such subsidies,
10Notice that movement from point D to point F can eventually pay off only to country i.
Its Cournot level of INIs must be under the minimum sufficient INI in point D, but moreover
Yˆi > Y
MIN
i (Yˆj) must hold. Only in case when Y C1 = YMIN1 (Y C2 ) & Yˆ1 = YMIN1 (Yˆ2), we have
the pure prisoner’s dilemma.
22
depending mainly on assumed spillover value. Thus, using a different methodol-
ogy, we support the findings of Haufler & Wooton (2006).
Free competition between producers of INIs will lead to stimuli schemes of
the Minimal Sufficient INI Model. On the contrary, if their supply is regulated
(e.g., by prohibition of ad hoc incentives), the equilibrium level corresponds to the
Optimal INI Model. This implies that on the background of the regulation of INIs,
the host country’s CIT rate does not have to represent a significant determinant
of the provision of INIs.
Our results are sensitive to the assumed type of competition, which is equiva-
lent to the usage of the Cournot model. But the framework (in a nutshell, formal-
izing INI as a commodity) is general enough to apply other models of oligopoly—
starting, e.g., with the Bertrand model. It would not be difficult to allow for some
broader differences between the studied countries (i.e., relaxing Assumption 10),
as well as for non-linear investors’ demands in the CIT rate, modifying the defini-
tion of inverse demand functions in (12). It is also possible to extend the analysis
to more than only 2 countries. Such modifications are left for further research.
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